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ABSTRACT 
 
Using survey data from China, I examine how migrant workers respond to violations of 
labor law in their workplaces.  The central puzzle explored is why, given apparent 
widespread violations, some workers choose not to pursue remedies. I find that although 
workers with shared local identities with their employers are more likely to work without 
employment contracts, they are less likely to be exposed to safety and health hazards at 
work and less likely to interpret problems experienced as a violation of their legal rights. 
This paper extends the research on grievance behavior by drawing on research from Law 
and Society and social networks to understand how these subjective interpretation 
processes and social identities outside of work influence grievance behaviors. While the 
empirical focus is on China, the theoretical extensions may help explain why workers in 
other settings fail to express grievances when confronted with workplace violations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 For feedback on previous drafts, I thank Matthew Amengual, Greg Distelhorst, Erin Kelly, Thomas 
Kochan, David Lewin, Paul Osterman, Christine Riordan, Susan Silbey, Sarah Swider, and session 
participants at MIT IWER seminar and 2017 LERA Annual Meeting. I also thank Linping Liu and Yanting 
Zhu for giving me access to the data. 
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The transformation of China’s economy from one dominated by state control to a 
mixture of private and state-owned enterprises has been accompanied by increased labor 
conflict. Between 1995 and 2007, the number of labor disputes accepted by labor dispute 
arbitration committees (LDAC), which are state labor agencies at the municipal and 
district levels, increased, on average, by 25 percent annually (Gallagher, Giles, Park, and 
Wang 2015). However, the disputes filed in LDAC is only the tip of the iceberg of the 
labor law violations workers experienced, especially for rural-to-urban migrant workers 
(afterwards, “migrant workers”) who have rural household registration but moved to 
cities for permanent or seasonal non-agricultural employment.  In 2015, there were 
approximately 277 million migrant workers, making up more than a third of the entire 
workforce of around 770 million in China (National Bureau of Statistics of the People's 
Republic of China 2016). According to data published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics, the percentage of migrant workers with formal employment contracts increased 
slightly from 42.8 in 2009 to 43.9 in 2012, but the percentage decreased from 41.3 to 
36.2 between 2012 and 2015. Around 85 percent of migrant workers worked more than 
44 hours per week, but few of them were covered by the mandatory social insurance 
(Table 1).  
[Table 1 near here] 
Given apparent widespread violations, why do some migrant workers choose not 
to pursue remedies? Existing studies have largely focused on the formal institutional 
constraints faced by migrant workers, such as the authoritarian state regime (Lee and 
Zhang 2013; Chen 2016), the inefficacy of government-controlled labor unions 
(Friedman and Lee 2010; Chen 2009), and the suppressed labor NGOs (Fu 2016; Lee and 
Shen 2011). However, less attention has been paid to informal social rules and their role 
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in determining workers’ perception of workplace problems.  This paper starts the analysis 
of worker grievances from workers’ subjective views and in doing so illustrates how the 
mainstream industrial relations literature on grievance behavior needs to be extended to 
incorporate insights from Law and Society on the perceptions of workplace injustice and 
to consider the social identities that migrant workers bring into their work roles.  Using 
data from a survey covering around 4000 migrant workers, I find that despite widespread 
labor law violations, only 25 percent of workers who experienced such violations 
interpret their experiences as labor rights violations. This is due in part to the social 
nature of their employment relationship:  when employers and migrant workers are from 
the same place of origin before migration, migrant workers are more likely to work 
without a contract and are less likely to be exposed to occupational safety and health 
(OSH) hazards at work. For people who experienced violations, those who have a shared 
local network with their employers are significantly less likely to acknowledge these 
violations. Furthermore, among those who acknowledge violations, workers with a 
shared local network with their employer are more likely to use organizational grievance 
channels. These results contribute to the employee grievance literature by emphasizing 
the importance of the subjective interpretation processes in the study of grievance 
behavior and of exploring the effects of workers’ social relationships and identities 
outside of work. 
Existing Theories of Employee Grievances  
One central question in the grievance procedure literature is, under what 
conditions do employees choose to file grievances? Numerous studies have proposed 
theories to predict employees’ grievance filing. The canonical exit-voice-loyalty model 
by Albert Hirschman (1970) predicts that more loyal employees will opt to stay and voice 
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discontent when they experience it. Freeman and Medoff (1984) apply Hirschman’s 
model and find that unionism, one possible employee voice mechanism, reduces turnover 
and permanent separations and raises job tenure by providing employees with voice 
options as alternatives to exit. This exit-voice-loyalty model has also been used to 
investigate post-grievance settlement outcomes. Lewin and his colleagues find evidence 
that employee loyalty is negatively associated with the exercise of voice and intent to exit 
the firm (Boroff and Lewin 1997), that use of employee grievance procedures is 
negatively correlated to post-grievance settlement job performance and promotion of 
grievants, and that use of grievance procedures is positively correlated to absenteeism 
and turnover (Lewin and Peterson 1999). Applying organizational punishment and 
industrial discipline theory (Arvey and Jones 1985), management retaliation was 
identified as a major obstacle to employee grievance filing.  
Motivated by efficiency wage theory in economics, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) 
apply an individual rational choice model to examine how labor market factors that 
determine the availability of alternative jobs affect employees’ grievance filing.  
Assuming the bounded rationality of individuals, they find that the pay premium and area 
unemployment rate are positively correlated to workers’ use of grievance procedures 
when the cost of using alternative methods (such as shirking or absenteeism) to resolve 
problems increases. Bacharach and Bamberger (2004) extend Cappelli and Chauvin’s 
framework by investigating the moderating effect of power dependence. They find that 
under the condition of high labor power, the wage premium was positively associated 
with grievance filing, as predicted by Cappelli and Chauvin (1991), but under the 
condition of low labor power, the relationship was largely weakened or reversed. Recent 
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studies of employee grievances retain this rational cost-effectiveness framework and 
introduce procedural justice into the grievance model (Lind and Tyler 1988). The focus 
of these studies is usually on how the interactions between employees’ individual 
characteristics (such as gender, self-esteem, and competence) and the perceived fairness 
of the grievance system affect their grievance filings and turnover (Morrison 2011; 
Kalaas, Olson-Buchanan, and Ward 2012).  
 
The Social Determinants of Grievances  
 
While this industrial relations research tradition has been fruitful in identifying 
the roles that employer behavior, law, power, rational choice, and formal institutions play 
in the filing of grievances, it has largely ignored how workers themselves experience law 
violations, their subjective evaluation of the experiences, and the potential role social 
relationships outside of the workplace might play in grievance filing behaviors. This gap 
is particularly problematic in the context of migrant workers in China, who have limited 
access to information about urban labor markets but carry with them deep regional ties 
with others from the same broadly defined native place when they migrate to cities 
(Honig 1992). 
Migrant workers not only rely extensively on local networks for employment but 
are also likely to work in enclave workplaces. According to a 2008 nationally 
representative household survey, the Rural to Urban Migration in China (RUMiC2), 
almost two thirds of migrant workers found their employment through family members 
                                               
2 RUMiC was initiated by researchers at Australian National University, the University of Queensland and 
the Beijing Normal University, and was supported by the Institute for Study of labor (IZA). The sampling 
design of the Rural and Urban Household Survey are based on that of the Annual Rural/Urban Household 
Survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
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(7.6%), relatives (21%), or friends (31.1%) (Long, Appleton, and Song 2017). Through 
these local networks, employers hire peasants from their hometown or migrant workers 
from the same place of origin who are already in the city (Pun and Lu 2010; Swider 
2015). Often, then, migrants work in workplaces owned by people from the same place of 
origin.  Enclaves are thus built upon these ties: “(t)he use of native-place relationships is 
‘the projection of consanguinity into space’ that is, the ability to link with others who are 
not close relatives but who, for the purposes of business, can be trusted as if they were 
relatives (Fei 1992 p.31-32).” Seeking out fellow relatives, provincials, or nationals for 
employment is an obvious and effective survival strategy used by Chinese migrant 
workers as well as many immigrant workers in an unfamiliar urban setting (Portes 1981; 
Sanders and Nee 1987; Perry 1993; Lee 1998; Pun and Smith 2007; Zhang 2011).   
 
Normative Regulation and Informal Control in Local Networks  
 
The first question I address is whether the shared local identities between workers 
and employers influence workers’ experience of labor law violations. Although states, 
laws, institutional and organizational rules, and contracts are formal control mechanisms 
that regulate organizational behaviors (Williamson 1979; Dunlop 1958), shared 
employer-worker local networks may serve as informal sanction and control mechanisms 
that regulate the employment relationship of immigrant or migrant workers. It is 
established, for instance, that normative regulation and informal social control have roles 
in maintaining social order (Durkheim 1893; Selznick 1948; Parsons 1968, Scott 2001). 
These involve publicly monitoring one another’s behavior and administering informal 
sanctions, such as those that might harm one’s reputation or hinder social approval 
(Galanter 1974; Felstiner 1974; Horwitz 1990). Existing US-based research on 
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immigration has shown that identification with others in the same ethnic enclave or 
community facilitates an informal economy, but the group norms and informal social 
control also reduce opportunistic behaviors in the enclaves (Sanders and Nee 1987; 
Wilson and Portes 1980; Bernstein 1992). For example, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) 
illustrate the role of collective identity in the presence of informal loan operations in the 
Dominican immigrant community of New York City. Within this community, money is 
made available for start-ups with little or no paperwork; the community members 
ostracize entrepreneurs who fail to repay their loans and so formal processes are not 
needed.  
The local enclaves in China behave in the same way, as they function as 
substitutes for formal institutions. In Fei’s 1947 book From the Soil (1992), he identifies 
Chinese society as “a society in which the consideration of order, not law, predominates; 
and in this context, order means each person must uphold the moral obligations of his or 
her network ties. Otherwise, the entire social system collapses” (p.24). Although the 
Chinese economic and political systems have significantly changed since Fei originally 
published his book in 1947, to understand the behavior of migrant workers and their 
understanding of the law, it is still worthwhile to go back to this classic to see whether the 
moral obligation norms and informal social control in these networks affect the 
implementation of the rule of Labor Contract Law in China today. The power that 
governs migrant workers’ actions and their interpretation of their situation may be less 
from a top-down authority or the law, but more from the bottom-up social contract and 
mutual consent based on informal controls in local enclaves. Therefore, I expect that 
migrant workers with shared local ties with their employers are less likely to enforce their 
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rights to have a written labor contract.  At the same time migrant workers with shared 
local ties should be less vulnerable to hour, wage and OSH violations because employers 
are also understood to have obligations within these networks.  
H1: All else equal, migrant workers who are from the same local network with their 
employer are more likely to work without a contract.  
H2a: All else equal, migrant workers who are from the same local network with 
their employer are less likely to experience hour violations.  
H2b: All else equal, migrant workers who are from the same local network with 
their employer are less likely to experience wage violations.  
H2c: All else equal, migrant workers who are from the same local network with 
their employer are less likely to experience OSH violations.  
 
The existing literature also suggests that a large number of migrant workers in 
China do not view participating in the legally mandated social insurance programs, 
especially pension insurance, as beneficial (Gallagher, Giles, Park, and Wang 2015; 
Chung 2015). Participating in most social insurance schemes requires contributions by 
both employer and workers. The current pension system requires an employer to 
contribute 20 percent of a worker’s wage to the local social pool of the region under the 
Pay as You Go system and requires the worker to contribute 8 percent of his or her own 
wage to the personal pool under the Funded System. After contributing 15 years or more, 
workers receive pensions from both systems. However, the problem is that pensions are 
not managed as a national integrated system but through regional pooling systems. If 
migrant workers move to another region or return home, only their contribution in the 
personal pool can be cashed out (Williamson and Deitelbaum 2005; Watson 2010; Gao, 
Yang, and Li 2012). Therefore, workers who do not have long-term plans in cities have 
strong incentives to forgo the social insurance requirement because complying with 
social insurance legal mandates often contradicts migrant workers’ short-term economic 
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interests. Given those concerns, workers who have a shared local network with their 
employer may collude with their employer to avoid the social insurance scheme in order 
to increase their take home pay. 
H3: All else equal, migrant workers who are from the same local network with their 
employer are more likely to work without mandated social insurance. 
 
Bringing “Naming” to the Grievance Model: Shared Local Identity and Workers’ 
Subjective Evaluation of Violations  
 
The existing approaches in standard grievance literature largely focuses on the 
grievance procedure structure, and neglect the role played by worker agency—that is, the 
way in which workers interpret problems experienced at work (Smith 2001; Hodson 
2001; Vallas 2006). The second question to be addressed is whether workers in fact view 
labor law violations experienced as violations of their rights.  Workers’ subjective 
evaluation of violations is a precondition to their choice of whether or not to take actions 
to enforce their rights. This gap in grievance procedure literature can be filled by theories 
from law and society, in which the dispute pyramid metaphor is used to model the dispute 
transformation process of “naming, blaming, and claiming,” that is, recognizing an 
injury, blaming the other party for their wrong doing, and seeking legal remedy 
(Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980; Miller and Sarat 1980). Although the law provides 
individuals with a powerful set of interpretative tools in naming an action as wrong, 
ordinary people do not simply interpret the law as official texts that embody formal legal 
rules or formal legal institutions (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Rather, workers hold 
normative perspectives of what constitutes acceptable managerial ethics. Their 
interpretations are influenced by the norms embedded in their social groups, such as the 
kinship network, religious groups, voluntary associations, and local enclaves (Macaulay 
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1963; Felstiner 1974; Ellickson 1991; Bernstein 1992; Roscigno and Hodson 2004).  
Therefore, a shared identity between employer and workers may reduce the probability 
that workers name an apparent violation as a problem to be remedied. This may be most 
evident in naming the lack of contract as injurious because these migrant workers expect 
that the informal social control in their local network will encourage the employers to 
fulfill their responsibilities even without a formal contract.  
Another branch of research influenced by the labor process tradition suggests 
workers may feel (and be expected to express) gratitude to those in their network who 
hire them. Edwards (1979) and Burawoy (1979) acknowledge the role of culture and 
ideology on employee control and workers’ consent to their own exploitation. In recent 
years, labor process theories have been extended to worker subjectivity and identity 
(Alvesson and Willmott 2002; Thompson and O’Doherty 2011). Shared local identity 
between employers and workers may create “relation-based hegemony,” which not only 
generates trust and loyalty, but also creates consent and diminishes dissatisfaction of 
workers (Zhou 2007; Shen 2007). In a detailed case study of a Hong Kong factory in 
China where kinship ties were extensively used in recruitment, Smart and Smart (1993) 
find that workers who become obligated through asymmetrical reciprocity can be 
required to work beyond the official requirements of job descriptions. Based on 60 in-
depth interviews, Zhang (2011) finds that employment within a local network was seen as 
a favor from employers to female migrant workers. Migrant women are expected by the 
employers and intermediaries, as well as themselves, to demonstrate gratitude for 
receiving this favor. Therefore, for those workers who experience law violations, people 
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with the shared local network with their employer are less likely to name the experience 
as injurious.  
H4: All else equal, among those who experienced labor law violations, migrant 
workers who are from the same local network with their employers are less likely 
to name labor law violations as injurious.   
 
Lastly, much of the early work in the sociology of law literature examines the 
likelihood that individuals would use the formal legal systems rather than alternative 
means of dispute resolution. Researchers associated with Berkeley Village Law Project 
suggest that those who share social networks are more likely to use informal systems 
rather than the courts to resolve disputes (Nader and Todd 1978). Since the use of court 
and other external dispute resolution procedures is extremely rare among ordinary 
migrant workers, I cannot test the hypothesis on whether migrant workers who are from 
the same local network as their employer are less likely to use courts or other external 
dispute resolution procedures to resolve the disputes than their counterparts. However, 
my data enables me to test whether those with the shared local network with the 
employer are more likely to use organizational grievance systems due to their shared 
identity with employers apart from work. 3 
H5: All else equal, among people who named violations as injurious, migrant 
workers who are from the same local network with their employers are more likely 
to use internal grievance procedures.  
 
Data and Measurements 
Data   
                                               
3 See Liu (2014) for a review of various internal and external labor dispute resolution institutions in China.  
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To test these hypotheses, I use a survey of around 4000 migrant workers in nine 
cities of Pearl River Delta (PRD) and ten cities of Yangzi River Delta (YRD). PRD and 
YRD are the top two mega-regions of China, hosting 43% (109 million) of China’s 
migrant workers (National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 2012). 
The survey was conducted in July and August of 2010 by the Center for Social Survey at 
Sun Yat-Sen University.4 Because of the high mobility rate of migrants, the survey uses 
quota sampling instead of random sampling to obtain participants: it gave quotas to the 
nineteen cities based on their share of migrant workers and then segmented respondents 
in the cities into groups by gender and industry based on census data. The respondents of 
the survey were found through random interception on the street near factories, and 
screened to choose those working in full-time jobs and lacking urban household 
registration (hukou) and four-year college degrees (Li and Freeman 2015).  
The survey imposed a maximum of one worker from firms with less than 30 
employees, three workers from firms with 30-299 employees, and five workers from 
firms with more than 300 employees.  If multiple workers were surveyed from one firm, 
the workers’ gender, occupation, age, or place of origin were varied. The survey does not 
use the residence-based sampling method that is used in other social surveys such as the 
General Social Survey (GSS) because a sizable proportion of migrant workers in China 
live in workplace dormitories, construction sites and other workplaces (Liu 2014). 
Although the survey does not use pure random sampling, it is the most comprehensive 
                                               
4 The nine cities in PRD include Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Zhaoqing, Dongguan, Huizhou, 
Zhongshan, and Jiangmen. The ten cities in YRD are Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, 
Nantong, Hangzhou, Nignbo, Jiaxing, and Shaoxing. The questionnaires were filled out by migrant workers 
with the assistance of hundreds of undergraduate and graduate student research assistants from Sun Yat-
Sen University, Nanjing University, Shanghai University, and Zhejiang Gongshang University. 
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and representative survey available to answer the research questions on migrant workers’ 
experiences and responses to labor law violations. My analytic sample includes 3919 
workers who reported information on their own demographic characteristics, contract 
status and insurance coverage, wages, hours, and working conditions, as well as their 
current firm’s information.  
Dependent Variables  
Experiencing violations. The survey asked respondents about their objective 
employment conditions in the current firm before asking about their subjective 
evaluations of these experiences. I grouped their objective experiences that would seem 
to violate labor law into five categories: no contract, no social insurance, overtime, wage 
violations, and OSH violations. The definition and coding strategy of these variables are 
described in Table A.1 in the appendix. These variables measure apparent labor law 
violations without assessing whether the workers themselves acknowledge them.  
Naming. After the respondents reported their objective experience of law 
violations, they were asked to evaluate the wrong. Naming is operationalized based on 
one question in the survey, which asks “Since August 2009, have you ever felt negatively 
(you yijian) on employee labor rights (laodong quanyi) toward your current firm?” 
Naming was coded as one if the worker answered yes to this question, zero otherwise. 
Grievance filing (claiming).  People who acknowledged the illegal practices (i.e., 
naming =1) were asked whether they had ever expressed grievances to the management 
in the past year. Organizational grievance channels include: suggestion box, hotlines, in-
house grievance office, focus group within the firm, conversation with management, 
conversation with supervisor, seeking solution with employer, enterprise labor union, 
employee work council, and others. Grievance filing was coded as a dummy variable that 
  
14 
 
equals one if the employee expressed all or part of his or her grievances to the 
management using any of these grievance channels, zero otherwise.  
Independent Variables 
Province network. I measure shared local network from a survey question that 
asks, “Does your current employer come from the same province as yourself?” Province 
network equals one if the respondent answered yes in question (1), zero otherwise.5   
Control Variables  
Female is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is female, zero 
otherwise. Female workers are more likely to work in gender-specific low-paying jobs 
but are less likely to work in physically demanding positions or at dangerous sites. 
Previous research also suggests female workers are less likely to name and claim 
violations because of their lack of self-confidence, avoidance of conflict (Gwatney-Gibbs 
and Lach 1994), and the internalized discipline of subordinates (Lee 1998).  
Age. The existing literature stresses the awakening and rights consciousness of the 
new generation of migrant workers (Chan and Pun 2009; Pun and Lu 2010; Chan and Hui 
2014), which suggests that younger migrant workers are less likely to work for employers 
who violate the labor laws and more likely to name and claim the violations.  
Education and Legal Knowledge. Respondents’ educational level and legal 
knowledge has been found to be associated with their job quality as well as their 
inclination to file grievances (Miller and Sarat 1980). Education is a categorical variable 
that equals zero if the respondents’ highest degree is primary school, one if middle 
                                               
5 I also construct city network and village network variables based on the question about workers’ city or 
village local network with their employer. The analyses using these alternative independent variables will 
be discussed in the footnotes.  
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school, two if high school or technical secondary school, and three if vocational school or 
higher. Legal knowledge is coded based on seven survey questions on respondents’ 
familiarity with seven labor laws and regulations6. The respondents were given a score 
based on their familiarity with each law or regulation (5=very familiar; 4=familiar; 
3=somewhat familiar; 2=not familiar; 1=have not heard about it).  Legal Knowledge is a 
continuous variable ranging from 7 to 35, as the sum of the seven scores.  
Wage premium is measured as the difference between the respondent’s average 
monthly wage since January 1, 2010, and the city’s monthly minimum wage in 2010. 
Because employees’ grievance behaviors involve some comparison of the cost and 
effectiveness of various ways of dealing with workplace problems, wage premium is a 
proxy that measures the value of current employment over alternative jobs in the external 
market.  
Peer network density. Previous research suggests that racial and ethnic enclaves 
have potentially beneficial effects through their creation of bounded solidarity that 
promotes and enforces reciprocity and norms that increase the provision of communal 
goods (Portes 1998). I suggest that the co-worker-based local enclave could increase the 
employees’ bargaining power with the employer and increase their possibility of 
grievance filing. Peer network density is a categorical variable that equals zero if none of 
the co-workers are from the same province as the respondent, one if less than 10%, two if 
10-20%, three if 20-30%, four if 30-50%, and five if more than 50%.  
                                               
6 The seven laws and regulations are Labor Law, Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, 
Minimum Wage Regulation, Regulation on Payment and Wages, Regulation on Work Injury Insurance, 
and Law on the Protection of Rights and Interest of Women. 
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Firm size is a categorical variable that equals zero if the firm has less than 100 
employees, one if the firm has 100 to 299 employees, two if the firm has 300 to 999 
employees, and three if the number of employees equals or exceeds 1000. Rationalist and 
neo-institutional sociologists suggest that larger firms are more likely to formalize 
workplace policies and practices (Blau, Falbe, McKinley, and Tracy 1976; Sutton, 
Dobbin, Meyer, and Scott 1994). Workers’ educational level and skill are also likely to 
be higher in larger firms than in smaller ones. I expect that workers in large firms are less 
like to experience, but more likely to name and claim, violations.  
Union is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a labor union in 
respondents’ firm or community. Although Chinese labor unions have always been 
criticized for being “paper unions,” recent research suggests heterogeneous organizing 
strategies of unions (Liu 2010; Friedman 2014) and unions’ positive effect on employees’ 
wage and welfare (Yao and Zhong 2013; Lu, Tao, and Wang 2010). I expect that the 
presence of unions is negatively correlated with experiencing labor law violations, and 
workers are more likely to name and claim violations if there are labor unions in their 
firms or communities.  
Firm ownership includes four groups: state and collectively owned enterprises 
(SOEs), domestic private enterprises (DPEs), Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan firms 
(HMTs), and other foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The literature suggests that 
private firms are less likely to provide labor contracts to their workers compared to firms 
of other ownership (Li and Freeman 2015), and SOEs have better OSH practices than 
firms of other ownerships (Chen and Chan 2010). Workers’ legal knowledge and 
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education, which affect their naming and grievance filing, may also vary across 
ownership types.   
Other control variables include the respondent’s industry (including agriculture 
and mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities, and service), marital status (married 
equals one if married, zero otherwise), their province of origin, and tenure at the current 
firm.  
Analysis 
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of labor law violations experienced by migrant 
workers, and the gap between the laws on the books and migrant workers’ subjective 
evaluations of the experience. Although 86% of the workers in the survey have 
experienced one or more types of labor law violations at their current firms, only 21% of 
the respondents indicated that they felt negatively towards their employer with regard to 
labor rights (i.e., naming=1) and only 14% of the respondents had used organizational 
grievance filing procedures. This reinforcing the value of using dispute pyramid to model 
these different stages of grievance behavior in China or elsewhere (Michelson 2007; 
Gallagher and Wang 2011).   
[Figure 1 near here] 
The use of local networks for employment is most common in construction sector, 
as suggested in the literature. In my analytic sample, 29.1% of the construction workers, 
13.3% of service sector workers, and 8.6% of the manufacturing sector workers have 
shared provincial local network with their employers.7 To assess how migrant workers’ 
                                               
7 23% (12%) of the construction workers, 9.2% (3.8%) of service sector workers, and 5.8% (3.5%) of the 
manufacturing sector workers in the sample has shared city (village) local network with their employer.  
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experience with and interpretation of labor law violations vary by the type of problem 
they encounter and their shared social relationships and identities with their employer, 
Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics for the key dependent variables for 
workers with and without shared provincial networks. In the full sample, social insurance 
has the highest rate of violation (69%), followed by overtime (37%), lack of contract 
(31%), wage violations (29%), and OSH violations (19%). Concerning Hypotheses 1-3, 
the bivariate tests show that workers who are from the same province as their employer 
are more likely to experience contract and social insurance violations, but are less likely 
to experience hour and occupational health and safety violations (p<0.01). However, the 
probabilities of experiencing wage violations are not significantly different between these 
two groups (p>0.1).  
Turning from objective experience to workers’ subjective evaluations of and 
actions toward the illegal practices, the “naming” rate is the highest for workers who 
experienced OSH violations (42%), followed by wage violations (33%), hour violations 
(28%), social insurance violations (25%), and contract violation (23%). Concerning 
Hypothesis 4, the bivariate tests show that when they experience violations, workers from 
the same province as their employers are less likely to name all types of violations, 
compared to their counterparts (p<0.05). Concerning Hypothesis 5, among workers who 
“named” a problem with their employers’ labor practices, workers who are from the same 
province as their employers are significantly more likely to use an organizational 
grievance channel to resolve the problem (p<0.05). I also compare the descriptive 
statistics for key independent variables between workers with and without shared 
provincial local network with employers. The statistics are reported in Appendix A.2.  
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[Table 2 near here] 
Table 3 includes regression results testing Hypotheses 1-3. I estimate logit models 
predicting the likelihood that workers experience violations related to contract (Model 1), 
social insurance (Model 2), hour (Model 3), wage (Model 4), and OSH (Model 5). As 
shown in Model 1 and Model 5, holding other variables constant, sharing a provincial 
local network with the employer increases the log odds of working without a contract by 
0.866 (p<0.01) and decreases the log odds of experiencing OSH violations by 0.426 
(p<0.05). These results offer support for Hypotheses 1 and 2c, but do not provide support 
for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 3.8  
As for the control variables, female workers are less likely to experience social 
insurance, hour, and OSH violations. Older workers are less likely to experience wage 
violations, which does not support the new generation migrant workers’ empowerment 
thesis. Workers with higher levels of education and legal knowledge are less vulnerable 
to most types of violations. At the firm level, workers who work in a firm or community 
with the presence of a union are less likely to experience contract and social insurance 
violations, which suggests the administrative power of the quasi-governmental unions to 
enforce the labor contract and social insurance laws. Compared to workers in SOEs, 
workers in DPEs are more likely to work without contracts and social insurance and are 
more likely to experience hour violations. Although workers in FIE and larger firms are 
less vulnerable to informal employment, they are more likely to experience hour 
violations at work. In other words, although foreign-owned and larger firms are more 
                                               
8 I also run regressions using city network and village network as key independent variables, respectively. 
The coefficient of city network on no contract is 0.951 (p<0.01) and on OSH is -0.502 (p<0.05). The 
coefficient of village network on no contract is 0.947 (p<0.01) and on OSH is -0.673 (p<0.1). These results 
are consistent with the findings present in Table 3.  
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likely to offer formal employment contracts to their employees, few of them comply with 
the overtime legislation.  
[Table 3 near here] 
 
To assess Hypothesis 4, in Table 4, I estimate logit models predicting the 
likelihood of naming among workers who experienced any type of law violation (Model 
6), contract violation (Model 7), social insurance violations (Model 8), hour violations 
(Model 9), wage violations (Model 10), and OSH violations (Model 11). Holding other 
variables constant, sharing a provincial local network with the employer decreased the 
log odds of naming any violations (Model 6) by 0.495 (p<0.01). This negative correlation 
between shared employer-worker local networks and naming labor law violations holds 
for workers who experience all types of violations (Models 7-11).9  
Another important finding in this table is that females are significantly less likely 
to name labor law violations than their male counterparts. This finding supports the 
ethnographic evidence that female workers’ willingness to cooperate and accept 
mistreatment are different from men’s, and gender identities play a central explanatory 
role in accounting for production politics (Lee 1998). In addition, consistent with the 
prediction in the literature, workers who have higher levels of education are more likely 
to name labor violations, and wage premiums in current firms are negatively correlated 
with workers’ naming of labor law violations. Age is not a significant predictor of 
                                               
9 I also run regressions M6-M11 using city and village network as key independent variables, respectively. 
Holding other variables constant, sharing city local network with the employer decreased the log odds of 
naming violation by 0.921 (p<0.01). Sharing village local network with the employer decreased the log 
odds of naming violation by 0.751 (p<0.01).These results are consistent with the findings presented in 
Table 4.  
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naming labor law violations, further challenging the new generation migrant workers’ 
rights consciousness thesis in the literature.  
[Table 4 near here] 
Lastly, I investigate the effects of local networks on workers’ grievance filing 
behaviors (Hypothesis 5). Because only people who name violations answered the 
question on grievance filing, in Model 12, I exclude respondents who do not name 
violations from the analysis. The results show that among people who name violations, 
sharing a provincial local network with the employer increases the log odds of filing 
grievance by 0.579 (p<0.1), all else equal. This result provides support for Hypotheses 5.  
Females are significant less likely to use organizational grievance procedures, compared 
to their male counterparts (p<0.01).  
It should be noted that because grievance-filing information is only available for 
workers who named violations, the results in Model 12 only apply to the subsample of 
workers who named violations. Another interesting question is whether this finding 
generalizes to other workers who do not acknowledge problems with their employers. 
The difference is seldom taken into account in standard grievance literature. There may 
be some unmeasured characteristics associated with both naming and grievance filing. If 
so, the estimates based on the self-selected subsample could be biased.  
To address this selection issue, Model 13 and Model 14 show results using a two-
stage Heckman probit model (Liao 1995), a variation of the original Heckman regression 
model (Heckman 1979). The sample in this analysis is workers who experienced one or 
more types of violation. The first-stage probit regression (M13) estimates a selection 
effect coefficient (inverse Mills ratio or λ), which is controlled in the second-stage model 
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(M14). I use the heckprob function in Stata to obtain maximum likelihood estimates, 
adjusting the standard errors by clustering cases at the city level. The correlation between 
the error terms of naming and grievance filing equations (rho) is 0.93, which means that 
unmeasured factors associated with naming increased the probability of grievance filing. 
The results show that, once having controlled for the probability that a person will not 
name the violation (i.e., λ), there is no evidence that people who share a local network 
with their employer are more likely to file grievances.10   
[Table 5 near here]  
 
Conclusion and Future Research Agenda 
Despite recent legislative efforts to address labor concerns, violations of Chinese 
labor law are rampant among the rural-to-urban migrant workers. One important reason 
for the weak enforcement of labor law is that migrant workers do not pursue possible 
cases through formal or legal channels. By analyzing migrant workers’ grievance 
behaviors, this paper makes two contributions to the employee grievance literature. First, 
by building the subjective interpretation process into our theoretical models of 
grievances, I find that only 25 percent (829 out of 3376) of migrant workers who 
experienced labor law violations subjectively name the experience as injurious, which is 
a key step before they take remedial actions. Second, the likelihoods of experiencing and 
naming violations are determined by workers’ social identities and relationships outside 
                                               
10 I also run regressions M12-14 using city and village network as key independent variables, respectively. 
Holding other variables constant, among people who named violations, sharing city local network with the 
employer increases the log odds of grievance filing by 0.987 (p<0.05). Sharing village local network with 
the employer increases the log odds of grievance filing by 0.9, but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. Once controlling for the probability that a person will not name the violation, there is no 
evidence that people who share city or village local network with employer are more likely to file 
grievances.  
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work. The analysis shows that a shared local network between employer and worker is 
positively associated with contract violations (β=0.866, p<0.01), but negatively 
associated with OSH violations (β= -0.426, p<0.05). These findings suggest that the 
informal social control mechanisms in local networks both relieve the felt need for a 
contract and reduce more serious violations regarding health and safety. In addition, 
workers who share a local network with their employer are significantly less likely to 
name labor law violations compared to their counterparts (β= -0.495, p<0.01). 
Furthermore, among those who named violations, workers who share a local network 
with their employer are more likely to express their grievances to management (β=0.579, 
p<0.1); but once controlling for unmeasured factors that may influence the likelihood of 
naming, there is no effect of shared network on grievance filing.  
Turning to an agenda for future grievance research, several expanded as well as 
new areas can be identified. First, this expansion of the grievance model needs to be 
tested in broader settings out of China. The social determinants of grievance behavior 
should be tested in other developing countries with high rates of informal employment as 
well as developed economies. For example, to explain the puzzle of why there have been 
few collective protests to challenge the social injustice and widening inequality in the 
United States, maybe we should look beyond the traditional worker grievance model and 
examine whether workers’ social identities, such as gender, race, religion, and 
immigration status, affect their perceptions and judgment of workplace violations to be 
worth challenging (Piore and Safford 2006; Roscigno and Hodson 2004).  
In addition, this study suggests that the grievance procedure literature should 
move beyond official dispute resolution institutions, such as mediation, arbitration, and 
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the courts. Grievance and resistance are rooted in the everyday work of ordinary workers. 
Limiting the scope of studies of worker grievance to formal dispute resolution institutions 
prevents scholars from exploring the relationship between formal institutions and other 
social structures as they are manifested in workers’ everyday lives (Vallas 2006; Hodson 
2001; Marshall and Barclay 2003).  
Third, the cross-sectional nature of the data prevents me from investigating the 
dynamics of workers’ reliance on local networks for employment, the effectiveness of the 
social control mechanism in the network, and workers’ interpretations of the law. Some 
scholars argue that governance of market exchange will evolve from relational networks 
to impersonal institutions (Peng 2003), while others predict that workers may continue to 
rely on social networks for employment in emerging economies (Boisot and Child 1996). 
Whether the obligations and informal social control will continue to serve as effective 
mechanisms regulating the employment relationship in a transition economy needs to be 
addressed in future work. Furthermore, workers’ interpretation and grievance filing is 
likely path-dependent and rooted in social norms, years since migration, managerial 
interventions, legal and policy reforms, and changing labor market conditions. Workers 
may gradually adjust to these changes and establish new social orders, norms, and 
practices. How migrant workers’ interpretations of the law change over time also 
deserves more attention in future research.  
Lastly, scholars should explore different workers’ interests, topics of their 
concern, and the underlying mechanisms that affect naming and claiming labor law 
grievances. Lee (2007) offers a good example of this research agenda by comparing 
different bases and means of worker grievance between northeastern China, where 
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workers are mostly laid-off from state-owned enterprises, and southern coastal China 
where workers are mostly rural migrants.11  Future research can go beyond the ownership 
and regional differences to explore workers’ needs across industry, occupation, 
organizational structure, gender, and ethnicities. For instance, the proportion of Chinese 
workers relying on temporary and labor dispatch agencies has increased rapidly in recent 
years (Friedman and Lee 2010; Liu 2015). Contingent workers’ concerns, expectations, 
interests and obstacles to use internal and external voice mechanisms should be 
investigated in future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 Also see Hurst (2004 2009) which compare the state-owned enterprise workers’ grievance, claims, 
tactics, frames, and mobilizing structures across different regions in China.  
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Figures  
Figure 1: Number of Migrant Workers who Experience Violations, Name Violation, and 
File Grievances 
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Tables  
Table 1: National Statistics on Labor Standards of Chinese Migrant Workers (%) 
 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Contract coverage  . 42.8 42 43.8 43.9 41.3 38 36.2 
Overtime (>44 hours/week)                   . 89.8 90.7 84.5 84.4 84.7 85.4 85 
Pension insurance   9.8 7.6 9.5 13.9 14.3 15.7 16.7 .  
Work injury insurance  24.1 21.8 24.1 23.6 24 28.5 26.2 .  
Medical insurance  13.1 12.2 14.3 16.7 16.9 17.6 17.6 .  
Unemployment insurance  3.7 3.9 4.9 8 8.4 9.1 10.5 .  
Maternity insurance  2 2.4 2.9 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.8 .  
    Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Key Dependent Variables: All Workers, With and Without 
Shared Provincial Local Network with Employer  
 
  All workers  
Workers without 
shared provincial 
employer-worker 
network 
Workers with shared 
provincial employer-
worker network  
Bivariate tests 
comparing with vs. 
without shared 
provincial network 
workers  
Variables  N  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  Mean SD 
T 
statistic  
P value 
(two-tail)  
Experiencing violations (full sample)          
Any violation  3919 0.861 0.346 3454 0.858 0.349 456 0.888 0.315 -1.920 0.055 
No contract  3919 0.314 0.464 3454 0.285 0.451 456 0.527 0.500 -9.911 0.000 
No social insurance  3919 0.685 0.465 3454 0.678 0.467 456 0.735 0.442 -2.615 0.009 
Wage violation  3919 0.291 0.454 3454 0.290 0.454 456 0.299 0.458 -0.390 0.696 
Overtime  3919 0.366 0.482 3454 0.374 0.484 456 0.308 0.462 2.911 0.004 
OSH 3919 0.191 0.393 3454 0.198 0.399 456 0.140 0.347 3.351 0.001 
Naming  (among workers who experience violations)        
Any violation  3,376 0.246 0.430 2,963 0.256 0.437 413 0.167 0.373 4.459 0.000 
No contract  1,229 0.234 0.423 984 0.255 0.436 245 0.147 0.355 4.067 0.000 
No social insurance  2,684 0.246 0.431 2,342 0.259 0.438 342 0.158 0.365 4.662 0.000 
Wage violation  1,141 0.331 0.471 1,002 0.341 0.474 139 0.259 0.440 2.048 0.042 
Overtime  1,436 0.283 0.450 1,293 0.290 0.454 143 0.217 0.414 1.990 0.048 
OSH 750 0.424 0.495 685 0.438 0.496 65 0.277 0.451 2.726 0.008 
Grievance filing (among workers who experience and name violations)    
Any violation  829 0.647 0.478 760 0.636 0.482 69 0.768 0.425 -2.452 0.016 
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Table 3: Logit Models Predicting Experiencing Different Type of Labor Law Violations 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Independent variables No contract No insurance Overtime Wage violations OSH 
      
Province network 0.866*** 0.117 -0.0567 -0.00683 -0.426** 
 (0.200) (0.0914) (0.132) (0.118) (0.175) 
Female 0.000149 -0.322*** -0.234** -0.0844 -0.670*** 
 (0.101) (0.0722) (0.115) (0.0661) (0.104) 
Married -0.158 0.0788 -0.0714 -0.252** -0.264** 
 (0.161) (0.129) (0.114) (0.104) (0.108) 
Age 0.00328 0.000842 -0.00448 -0.0132** -0.00873 
 (0.00746) (0.00565) (0.00883) (0.00587) (0.00677) 
Education (ref. primary school or lower)       
Middle school -0.187* -0.138 -0.113 -0.127 -0.0897 
 (0.0998) (0.115) (0.0918) (0.123) (0.147) 
High school or equivalent -0.344*** -0.702*** -0.442*** -0.102 -0.288** 
 (0.107) (0.139) (0.124) (0.150) (0.144) 
Vocational school or higher -0.869*** -1.159*** -1.076*** 0.156 -0.751*** 
 (0.207) (0.186) (0.253) (0.185) (0.271) 
Legal knowledge -0.0491*** -0.0298*** -0.00255 -0.0298*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.0106) (0.00998) (0.0103) (0.00788) (0.0106) 
Tenure -0.0540*** -0.0425*** -0.0348** -0.00577 -0.00964 
 (0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0138) (0.00908) (0.00969) 
Wage premium (1000 yuan) -0.0470* -0.00868 0.0355 -0.00988 -0.0440 
 (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0267) (0.0182) (0.0332) 
Union -1.447*** -0.480*** -0.153 -0.0178 -0.208 
 (0.192) (0.0984) (0.135) (0.129) (0.157) 
Firm ownership (ref. SOEs)      
      
DPEs 0.628*** 0.374** 0.423** -0.181 0.0883 
 (0.217) (0.189) (0.169) (0.190) (0.196) 
HMTs -0.196 0.226 0.667*** -0.519** 0.240 
 (0.238) (0.208) (0.232) (0.205) (0.187) 
FIEs -0.530** -0.240 0.624** -0.595*** -0.0356 
 (0.263) (0.213) (0.245) (0.208) (0.213) 
Firm size (ref. <100 employees)       
100-299 employees -0.923*** -0.466*** 0.286* 0.125 -0.0288 
 (0.124) (0.134) (0.152) (0.119) (0.122) 
300-999 employees -1.479*** -0.683*** 0.535*** -0.0183 0.0142 
 (0.0943) (0.178) (0.0943) (0.110) (0.171) 
>1000 employees -2.019*** -0.880*** 0.701*** -0.262* -0.0414 
 (0.187) (0.139) (0.138) (0.141) (0.133) 
Province of origin dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.726 1.807* -2.558** -0.443 -1.269 
 (1.599) (0.952) (1.135) (0.990) (1.038) 
Pseudo R2 0.263 0.200 0.103 0.0462 0.0903 
Observations 3,909 3,909 3,914 3,914 3,905 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Robust standard errors clustered at city in parentheses.
  
36 
 
 
 
Table 4: Logit Models Predicting Naming among Workers Who Experienced Different Type of Violations 
 (Dependent variable: Naming)  
 
Independent variables M6 
(any violation) 
M7 
(no contract) 
M8 
(no insurance) 
M9 
(overtime) 
M10 
(wage 
violations) 
M11 
(OSH) 
Province network -0.495*** -0.620*** -0.589*** -0.443*** -0.381* -0.680*** 
 (0.133) (0.236) (0.146) (0.154) (0.209) (0.262) 
Female -0.321*** -0.350*** -0.365*** -0.225 -0.349*** -0.329* 
 (0.0775) (0.121) (0.0701) (0.138) (0.0844) (0.173) 
Married -0.0258 0.119 -0.138 -0.0334 0.223 0.0276 
 (0.166) (0.218) (0.165) (0.145) (0.238) (0.307) 
Age 0.00188 0.00125 0.000807 0.0109 0.00297 0.00874 
 (0.00647) (0.00877) (0.00654) (0.00766) (0.0101) (0.0144) 
Education (ref. primary school or lower)        
Middle school 0.367** 0.706*** 0.273 0.637*** 0.565*** 0.648*** 
 (0.151) (0.242) (0.175) (0.221) (0.218) (0.228) 
High school or equivalent 0.296* 0.809** 0.168 0.540** 0.564** 0.603** 
 (0.178) (0.321) (0.205) (0.215) (0.252) (0.276) 
Vocational school or higher 0.341 0.777** 0.350 0.428 0.176 0.315 
 (0.224) (0.331) (0.264) (0.334) (0.253) (0.265) 
Legal knowledge 0.00118 -0.0160 0.00573 0.0152 0.00264 0.0112 
 (0.0119) (0.0183) (0.0144) (0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0205) 
Tenure -0.00541 -0.0198 -0.00485 0.00380 -0.0173 0.0261 
 (0.0112) (0.0208) (0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0240) (0.0246) 
Wage premium (1000 yuan) -0.144*** -0.106 -0.211*** -0.175** -0.0877 -0.204* 
 (0.0370) (0.0769) (0.0390) (0.0854) (0.0557) (0.110) 
Union 0.0541 0.478 0.00336 0.103 0.0229 0.0520 
 (0.108) (0.318) (0.132) (0.189) (0.216) (0.303) 
Firm ownership (ref. SOEs)       
DPEs 0.125 0.290 0.177 0.316 0.583* 0.536 
 (0.196) (0.420) (0.189) (0.221) (0.343) (0.335) 
HMTs 0.204 0.441 0.112 0.378 0.625 0.780* 
 (0.231) (0.682) (0.215) (0.255) (0.430) (0.403) 
FIEs 0.178 0.123 -0.0796 0.279 0.850** -0.117 
 (0.212) (0.529) (0.263) (0.237) (0.421) (0.542) 
Firm size (ref. <100 employees)        
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100-299 employees -0.00763 -0.287 -0.0264 0.107 0.229 0.126 
 (0.127) (0.231) (0.124) (0.165) (0.184) (0.258) 
300-999 employees 0.228** 0.279 0.259** 0.281 0.182 0.333 
 (0.0932) (0.212) (0.106) (0.203) (0.155) (0.206) 
>1000 employees 0.0870 0.263 0.132 0.0173 0.217 0.256 
 (0.106) (0.309) (0.107) (0.194) (0.231) (0.173) 
Province of origin dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.785 -0.0431 -0.631 -2.526** -1.771* 0.171 
 (0.656) (1.017) (0.722) (1.084) (1.040) (1.825) 
Pseudo R2 0.0382 0.0753 0.0413 0.0412 0.0623 0.0771 
Observations 3,367 1,182 2,669 1,423 1,133 742 
                    * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Robust standard errors clustered at city in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Models Predicting Grievance Filing 
 
Independent variables  
M12 
Logit Predicting 
Grievance Filing 
among those who 
name violations  
Heckman Model Predicting 
Grievance Filing Controlling for 
Likelihood of Naming Violations 
M13 
Naming 
violations  
M14 
Grievance 
filing  
Province network 0.579* -0.273*** -0.0535 
 
(0.31) (0.08) (0.13) 
Female -0.375** -0.182*** -0.244*** 
 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.07) 
Married 0.205 -0.0342 0.0359 
 
(0.26) (0.09) (0.10) 
Age -0.0167* 0.000479 -0.00416 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (ref. primary school or lower)    
Middle school -0.248 0.217** 0.101 
 
(0.22) (0.09) (0.10) 
High school or equivalent -0.191 0.189* 0.0836 
 
(0.29) (0.11) (0.09) 
Vocational school or higher 0.816** 0.152 0.326 
 
(0.41) (0.13) (0.21) 
Legal knowledge  -0.00646  
  (0.01)  
Tenure 0.0301 -0.00561 0.00257 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wage premium (1000 yuan) 0.188* -0.0841*** -0.00688 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.04) 
Peer network density  0.0349  0.0113 
 (0.05)  (0.02) 
Union 0.293 -0.0101 0.0732 
 
(0.28) (0.08) (0.12) 
Firm ownership (ref. SOEs)   
DPEs -0.0581 0.04 0.00992 
 
(0.26) (0.11) (0.12) 
HMTs -0.409 0.0671 -0.11 
 
(0.33) (0.11) (0.13) 
FIEs -0.167 0.0902 -0.000598 
 (0.39) (0.11) (0.17) 
Firm size (ref. <100 employees)    
100-299 employees 0.0656 -0.0161 0.0058 
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(0.16) (0.06) (0.08) 
300-999 employees -0.449* 0.144*** -0.0112 
 
(0.25) (0.05) (0.15) 
>1000 employees -0.31 0.0554 -0.0433 
 (0.34) (0.06) (0.15) 
Constant 2.114 -0.638*** -0.586 
 (1.35) (0.15) (0.63) 
Industry dummies  Yes  No  Yes  
City dummies Yes  No  Yes  
Rho    0.938 
   (0.127) 
Pseudo R2 0.0864   
Observations 792 3,339 3,339 
             * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Robust standard errors clustered at city in parentheses.
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Labor Law Violations 
Labor Law 
Violations 
Description 
No Social 
Insurance  
Respondents to the survey were asked whether their current employers provided 
pension insurance, medical insurance, work injury insurance, unemployment 
insurances, and maternity insurance. No social insurance is a dummy that equals one 
if the respondent does not have all five social insurance required by the law. 
No Labor 
Contract  
One question in the survey asks, "Have you ever signed a written labor contract in 
your current firm?" No labor contract equals one if the worker answered no to this 
question, zero otherwise. 
Overtime  
Chinese labor law prohibits employers from requiring their employees to work 
overtime for more than 36 hours per month. One question in the survey asks the 
respondents, "Have you ever worked overtime since January 1, 2010?" Workers who 
answered yes to this question were required to report their overtime hours in the 
previous month. I code overtime as a dummy variable, which equals one if their 
overtime work exceeded 36 hours the month before the interview, zero otherwise. 
Wage 
Violations  
Wage violation equals one if the employee has experienced any of the following 
violations:  
(1) A prevalent form of Labor Law violation is employee paying “deposits” to 
the employer in forms of money or documents. These “deposits” prevent 
workers from leaving their jobs where their rights are violated. In the 
survey, the respondents were asked two questions: (a) "When you joined the 
current firm, did you pay a money deposit?" and (b) "When you joined the 
current firm, were your government issued ID, graduation certificate, or 
(temporal) residence permit detained by the management?" Deposit is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the worker answered yes to any of these 
two questions, zero otherwise. 
(2) The Labor Law provides that employees must be compensated if they work 
overtime. One question in the survey asks, “Does your current firm have 
overtime compensation?” Overtime without compensation is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the respondent answered no to this question, and 
overtime equals one.  
(3) The Labor Law requires that wages shall not be misappropriated nor shall 
the employer fall in arrears without justification. The survey asks, “Since 
January 1, 2010, have you ever been imposed a fine or wage deduction at 
your current firm?” For those who answered yes, they were asked, “Does 
the firms impose the fine or deduction following institutional rules?” I code 
wage misappropriation as one if the worker answered no to this question, 
zero otherwise.  
(4) The survey asks, “Since January 1, 2010, have you ever experienced wage 
arrears in your current firm?” Wage arrears is coded as one if the 
respondent answered yes to the question, zero otherwise.  
(5) Under China’s minimum wage system, minimum wage levels are fixed by 
local governments and are regularly adjusted.  The survey asks about 
respondents’ average monthly wage since January 2010. I code Below 
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Minimum as one if the worker’s monthly wage is below the city minimum 
wage in 2010, zero otherwise.  
OSH  
The Labor Law requires employers to provide necessary protective equipment, such 
as goggles, work clothes, head covering, and other items needed for the protection of 
workers. For workers in dangerous occupations or exposed to hazardous substances, 
the employer is required to provide regular medical examination at company 
expense. In addition, both Chinese Labor Law and Criminal Law explicitly prohibit 
physical abuse. 
In the survey, the workers were asked a series of questions related to their experience 
of health and safety violations. OSH equals one if workers experienced any of these 
three violations.  
(1) Unprotected work. The survey asks, “Since August 1, 2009, have you 
worked under dangerous conditions without protection in your current 
firm?” Unprotected work equals one if the respondent answered yes, zero 
otherwise.  
(2) Hazardous work without exam. The survey asks, “Since August 1, 2009, 
have you worked in a hazardous environment (such as exposed to hazardous 
substance and noise) in the current firm?” It also asks, “Have you ever 
received a free physical exam in your current firm?” hazardous work 
without exam is a dummy variable, which equals one if the worker reported 
his working environment in the current firm is physically harmful (i.e., 
exposed to hazardous substance, noise, etc.) and the current firm did not 
provide physical examinations.  
(3) Physical abuse. The survey asks, “Since August 1, 2009, have you 
experienced forced labor, penalty kneeling and standing, improper search, 
battery, or seizure by the management?” If the worker experienced any of 
these experiences, physical abuse is coded as one, zero otherwise. 
Any violation  
Any violation is a dummy variable if the workers experienced any of the five types of 
violations, zero otherwise.  
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Table A. 2: Descriptive Statistics for Key Independent Variables: All Workers, With and Without Shared Provincial Local Network 
with Employer  
 
  All workers  
Workers without shared 
provincial employer-
worker network 
Workers with shared 
provincial employer-
worker network  
Bivariate tests comparing 
with vs. without shared 
provincial network workers  
Variables  N  Mean SD N  Mean SD N  Mean SD 
T 
statistic  
P value (two-tail)  
Female 3,919 0.455 0.498 3,454 0.461 0.499 465 0.417 0.494 1.779 0.076 
Married 3,919 0.579 0.494 3,454 0.576 0.494 465 0.604 0.490 -1.187 0.236 
Age 3,919 30.309 9.373 3,454 30.075 9.063 465 32.042 11.276 -3.607 0.000 
Primary school or lower 3,919 0.158 0.365 3,454 0.151 0.358 465 0.209 0.407 -2.899 0.004 
Middle school 3,919 0.434 0.496 3,454 0.441 0.497 465 0.383 0.487 2.425 0.016 
High school or equivalent 3,919 0.274 0.446 3,454 0.272 0.445 465 0.286 0.452 -0.622 0.534 
Vocational school or 
higher 
3,919 0.134 0.341 3,454 0.135 0.342 465 0.123 0.328 0.792 0.429 
Legal knowledge 3,919 3.290 4.290 3,454 15.895 5.173 465 15.630 5.308 1.013 0.312 
Tenure 3,919 3.290 4.290 3,454 3.193 4.162 465 4.015 5.089 -3.338 0.001 
Wage premium  
(1000 yuan) 
3,919 1.174 1.320 3,454 1.162 1.259 465 1.266 1.703 -1.276 0.203 
Union 3,919 0.217 0.412 3,454 0.219 0.414 465 0.200 0.400 0.980 0.328 
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Firm ownership            
SOE 3,919 0.098 0.298 3,454 0.097 0.296 465 0.110 0.313 -0.826 0.409 
DPEs 3,919 0.722 0.448 3,454 0.704 0.457 465 0.854 0.354 -8.261 0.000 
HMTs 3,919 0.108 0.310 3,454 0.120 0.325 465 0.015 0.122 13.286 0.000 
FIEs 3,919 0.072 0.259 3,454 0.079 0.270 465 0.022 0.145 7.059 0.000 
Firm size             
<100 employees  3,919 0.324 0.468 3,454 0.301 0.459 465 0.497 0.501 -8.002 0.000 
100-299 employees 3,919 0.230 0.421 3,454 0.236 0.425 465 0.183 0.387 2.763 0.006 
300-999 employees 3,919 0.203 0.403 3,454 0.207 0.405 465 0.174 0.380 1.751 0.081 
>1000 employees 3,919 0.243 0.429 3,454 0.256 0.436 465 0.146 0.354 6.077 0.000 
Industry             
Manufacturing  3,919 0.546 0.498 3,454 0.566 0.496 465 0.398 0.490 6.938 0.000 
Construction  3,919 0.070 0.255 3,454 0.056 0.231 465 0.172 0.378 -6.437 0.000 
Service  3,919 0.229 0.420 3,454 0.226 0.418 465 0.258 0.438 -1.511 0.131 
Pearl River Delta  3,919 0.498 0.500 3,454 0.498 0.500 465 0.492 0.500 0.234 0.815 
 
